ENOUGH IS ENOUGH! Stop Racism, Reverse-Racism, Civil Rights as Warfare See discussion on RRT-1/Enough SEE: RRT INDEX 1-22 IN THIS SECTION RRT American city fighting BLM Related Riots versus older Iraq War Zone Baghdad Fadhil 2008 Notes - Personal - Black Lives Matter Black Lives Matter input from bulk of #1 News/#2 Personal Notes ------------------------------------------------------------------------- CASE STUDY IRAQ vs USA - BLM RIOTS Possible applicability and idea bank for riot team responses to Black Lives Matter riots linked to radical and criminal Islamic terrorists. The reference for this discussion at this point is Daniel P. Bolger’s 2015 book Why We Lost: A General’s Inside Account of the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars Some basic points: An earlier Fadhil event in 2007 in which American troops went in was bloody and left people feeling it was a bad area. In 2008 the Americans tried another tactic using a known criminal to help them get inside the corrupt system. In 2009 they had to try something yet again by getting rid of the criminal helper who had turned sour while working with an increasingly autonomous Iraqi government controlled enterprises. While you read through this, think about the American cities that American riot control groups have had to deal with: Portland, Minneapolis, etc. They encountered burnings, apparently just localized petro-bombs (anything worse might have been suppressed in the news to the public), various types of shrapnel, harsh and smearing language directed at them, and more. Realize that several of the rioters can and do have very direct ties to Radical Islam. This can include connections to local, regional and distant mosques. Some of these people could have very real experience fighting against Americans overseas and are here stateside either as pretentious immigrants or outright illegal aliens. -------------------------------------------------------------------------- Gray zones can occur when the American military and/or police work with criminals, terrorists or others who have previously been the “enemy” or on the wrong side of the law. It can make you dirty, or at least feel dirty. In addition, the old habits of the new “friend” might carry on somewhere, either farther off where you don’t directly see it, or right next to you. Their criminality might rub off on you. Their players might dominate social settings in which you work together. In addition, their crimes might make you look bad, like you are part of it or agree to it. You can be or feel guilty by association. Getting to know the inner city neighborhoods through repeated military/police beats, start to know the places, people, habits, nooks and crannies, it stops being so mysterious and scary. Outside, non-local feds need to work with local beat street police who know the neighborhoods. When local political leaders and others are blocking this cooperation, we need to have a Plan B and C on how to get around infiltrated city and state leadership to work with other kinds of locals who know the area; this can include things like firefighters, local retired Navy Seals, etc. This response is to regional enemy takeovers. Outside Feds need to work with locals whether from the local police or from an emergency preparedness Plan B/C group. Use people who have experience applying counter-terrorism efforts inside hostile city zones, including specific neighborhoods or areas. Everything from how to maneuver on foot or in vehicles to how to investigate through questioning locals. Be ready to slough off an agent/group that might originally have helped break the ice but has proven corrupt and counter- productive Shwey Shwey means go slow in bits. It means “slowly, slowly” in Arabic. This was a process Captain Frank Rodriguez employed in the startup to get control of Fadhil. DISCUSSION Operation Shwey Shwey 2009 (Bolger, p. 262) As of 2008, Fadhil was an ancient slum-like neighborhood inside the huge city complex of Baghdad. It was only about a mile and a half square area. It held about 50,000 Sunni Baathists - the type that was in association with the Saddam Hussein regime that was ousted by the Americans/coalition via an invasion force started in March 2003. In the previous battles, both Iraqi and Americans had been killed and injured in Fadhil, as they ran up against fierce opposition. After several battles inside Fadhil in 2007, Americans went back to Fadhil in 2008 determined to do something differently. These Sunni Baathists would intermittently fight their Muslim enemy, Shias, in other Baghdad neighborhoods. A “Don” of the mafia-style type worked and operated inside Fadhil at the time named Adel Al-Mashadani. He basically controlled the Fadhil space through extortion, but also provided favors to supplicants to the point “old women would kiss his hand, thanking him for stuff.” (p. 261) The Americans decided to try to employ the Sahwa model and Sons of Iraq using this Don Mashadani on the payrolls. This means that they used a technique applied to the Anbar Province on the western side of Iraq, an area with a small number of populated cities in a swath of rural, low populated countryside that backed up to Syria and Jordan. Over there, tribal sheikhs and Americans, including the military and CIA, worked together in something eventually called “Sons of Iraq” to fight Al-Qaeda of Iraq. This occurred during the Surge when Bush ordered a huge increase of 20,000 troops into Iraq. Many of these sheikhs/tribal groups had previously helped Al Qaeda in fighting the Americans. They decided to work for the Americans because Al Qaeda had taken control games too far by killing and abusing their people. Since that operation showed a shift in that region of Iraq, the Americans decided to try it in the inner city of Baghdad. The Americans and their Iraqi counterparts eventually felt they had to dissolve Mashadani and the Sons of Iraq. At first working with Mashadani seemed to result in less crime and killings in the Fadhil area, but his corrupt ways and a tendency to double-cross caused the Americans and Iraqi coalition forces to decide to put a stop to it. The Iraqis jumped the gun and grabbed Mashadani early without telling the Americans in advance of their plan. This set up a huge fight inside that area. Iraqi coalition forces called Americans for help. Seven Iraqis were abducted. Mashadani’s deputy held them and tried to negotiate, one of the Iraqi coalition leaders held firm and eventually the seven were released alive outside an American outpost nearby. In 2009, Rodriguez carefully thought out a plan to oust Mashadani: “In essence, they wanted to take a few months to infuse Lt. Colonel Ali Mahmoud’s First Battalion 43rd Iraq Army Brigade into Fadhil, to supplant Mashadani’s mafia with legitimate authority. They would keep meeting with Mashadani and his men and get the Sons of Iraq to join the American-Iraqi patrols. They anticipated emplacing Iraqi army checkpoints in Fadhil alongside those manned by teh Sons of Iraq. They planned to assist the IRaqi military in civic acation programs instead of funneling funds through Mashadani….” Eventually there would be a head-on with Mashadani and his group, and there would either be fight or not, but either way, the Americans and Iraqis would be ready. (Bolger, p. 262) There was a burst of fighting after getting rid of the Sons of Iraq and their corrupt leader, but after that, the Americans and their Iraqi counterparts held the city. The correlation with this story to American BLM Riot zones is this: Sometimes to break up a problem, both the military and police have to cooperate with thugs who have contacts and know the rules inside the battle zone. Inner cities - including marginal or outskirt zones of a large city - have their own dynamics. You are dealing with civilians alongside uglies. It’s a mixed zone area in which you don’t want unnecessary violence against civilians. At the same time, as in Iraq, American cities have almost all combatants in civilian attire. They blend into the populace, making it hard to discern civilian from tyrant. These are peculiarities that people trained in Iraq city battle zones can apply knowledge, training and experience to stateside. It is important to work with local police and others who know the neighborhood. There are nooks and crannies inside these inner city areas where people can hide or exploit to do violence against riot response teams or others. ADDITIONAL COMMENTS Native Americans should be on your radar: Realize too that many Native American groups have cooperated with the enemy, with several of these instigating the very protests that later became riots and battle zones. Investigate whether any of those tribal members caught rioting have had proven histories working with the enemy overseas. Take the Native American presence seriously and consider it a high priority in investigations and responses. Some of it is coming in through having black mixed racial people among them, but that is not the only reason many have supported Black Lives Matter. It is way past time to consider the Native American/BLM quotient a high priority in any further anti-BLM work. Many are networking and have a plan in their cooperation with a Minority Power Movement takeover, which includes inside malls, Walmarts, certain major cell phone carrier, your local grocery chain and politics. Updates 2021/09/16 bolds cleared; 2020/10/28 page started